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Summary Overview
Politically-motivated aid for the occupied Palestinian territories has ostensibly promoted 
“development” and “reconstruction” while indirectly supporting Israel’s policies of occupation and 
Palestinian de-development. The result: a steady increase in Palestinian poverty rates, ongoing Israeli 
expropriation of Palestinian lands and resources, and the continuing blockade of Gaza. More than ever, 
Palestinians need a drastic change in development approach. 
An emerging inclusive enterprise development framework can work in the Palestinian context. A 
Sustainable Local Enterprise Networks (SLENs) approach to development and reconstruction has 
shown promise among war-affected communities in Lebanon and is currently being explored across 
Sudan and for Palestinian refugees. Al-Shabaka policy advisor Samer Abdelnour analyzes Oslo-inspired 
pitfalls of Palestinian development, misguided donor attempts to promote private sector development, 
and the promise of SLENs.
Oslo and the ambiguity of aid
Since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, Palestinian economic and social de-
development has evolved along a path-dependent model aligned with Israeli economic and political 
interests (Roy 1995, 1999). This process continued and worsened after the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. 
The economic power imbalance between the Palestinians and the Israelis was institutionalized at the 
negotiating table through the 1994 Paris Protocol. Signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) with Israel, the Protocol maintained Palestinian economic integration and dependency on the 
Israeli economy and denied Palestinians the opportunity to develop economic borders and sovereignty. 
The Protocol gave Israel full control over taxes, revenue collection and related disbursements to the 
Palestinian Authority (PA); maintained Israeli control over the passage of Palestinian regional and 
international trade; and provided for an open Palestinian economy with no restrictions on foreign 
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ownership or transfer of net profits. Because Israel made acceptance of the protocol a condition for 
allowing continued Palestinian work permits in Israel, the PLO felt little choice but to accept it.1
Oslo emphasized the use of international funds to develop the Palestinian economy. International 
funds are directed to Palestinians without pressure on Israel to end its occupation or remove structural 
barriers to economic and political de-development. International donors have significant influence over 
the PA through formal aid structures, steering committees, and multilateral working groups. The result 
is a “checkbook” diplomacy, whereby international aid indirectly funds the expropriation of Palestinian 
lands and siege of Gaza, while drastically limiting the sovereignty of the PA. Indeed, the PA has no 
independent source of revenue: two-thirds of its budget is made up of revenues collected by Israel; 
the other third is provided by foreign aid (Turner, 2009). 
The superficially aid-supported Palestinian economy eventually buckled under Israeli economic and 
military pressure as well as colonization and other occupation policies. Israel’s long-term policy of 
economic and social de-development has rendered Gaza one of the world’s most tragic humanitarian 
crises, even before the devastation caused by Operation Cast Lead and the ongoing blockade.2 
Aid donors are increasingly promoting the use of private sector approaches for development in 
reconstruction contexts (MacSweeney & Tanburn, 2008). However, utilizing top-down multilateral 
aid to promote private sector development in occupied Palestinian territory will certainly lead to 
disappointing results for the majority of Palestinians. Such an approach has led to increased abuses 
of donor funds by the Palestinian political elite, an example being the recent dissemination of aid 
funds intended for Palestinian farmers and small-scale businesses to Wataniya.3  The suggestion by 
caretaker Prime Minister Salam Fayyad that donors give funds for Gaza reconstruction to the PA to 
be distributed directly to beneficiaries via banks raises serious questions as to who will benefit from 
the reconstruction windfall, especially considering the limited ability of the PA or the Palestinian 
commercial banking industry to connect with Gaza’s displaced and destitute. 
Palestinian security, economic and governance functions are rendered powerless by Israel or “guided” 
by the policy of international donors and finance institutions. This will not change unless Israel is held 
legally and fiscally accountable for the occupation, destruction, and expropriation of Palestinian lands 
and resources, and until Palestinians are able to exercise their right to political and economic self-
determination. In the meantime, there are options for Palestinians living under occupation to challenge 
this situation through tested approaches to local enterprise development, echoing the strategies of the 
first Intifada.
The promise of SLENs
There is recognition that a new development paradigm must reduce Palestinian dependence on Israeli 
products, services, and imported aid-related food and reconstruction goods. Given the significant 
external constraints driving the distortion of aid and the continued de-development and suffering 
of Palestinians, the focus must be internal on inclusive, community-based coping and reconstruction 
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strategies. Such an approach must also work to lay the foundation for Palestinian economic sovereignty 
through the creation of a viable, sustainable, and secure national market-based economy (UNCTAD, 
2006; 2009).
During the first Intifada, Palestinians living under occupation reduced Palestinian economic 
dependence on Israel. Initiatives included promoting the consumption of Palestinian products, 
generating local employment, and a return to land and agriculture for encouraging market as well as 
subsistence production. Such was the first indigenous Palestinian economic agenda as a movement of 
national self-determination and economic self-sustainability (UNCTAD, 2009). These measures were 
met with Israeli economic, military and political aggression and were eventually subsumed by the Oslo 
process.
A promising new model of development is the Sustainable Local Enterprise Networks (SLENs) 
framework, which promotes inclusive, local markets-based approaches to development. SLENs are 
collaborative, trust-based networks that deliver human, social, financial and ecological benefits for 
all participants (Wheeler, McKague, Thomson, Davies, Medalye & Prada, 2005). A key feature is that 
they seek to foster inclusive relationships and the building of enterprise capacity among numerous 
stakeholders and partners including entrepreneurs, the development sector, civil society, local 
investors, training institutions, community members, businesses, community leaders and government 
actors, particularly local government. SLENs offer an alternative to traditional development activities 
that often have a narrow focus and undermine local generation of creativity, capabilities and self-
reliance. 
In Mauritania, for example, the Tiviski dairy has successfully reversed the country’s dependence 
on imported milk by developing a supply chain inclusive of nomadic herders. Its networks bring 
fresh camel and goat milk products – including milk, cheeses and chocolate – to urban customers 
and provide fair incomes to rural and nomadic suppliers. Importantly, it helps rural and nomadic 
communities support and protect traditional lifestyles and customs. 
The SLENs framework is also being considered in the Sudan for the development of postwar technical 
and vocational enterprise in Southern Sudan, and for the reintegration of ex-combatants and war-
affected communities in the transitional and Darfur states.4  A collective of blacksmiths in Darfur 
exemplify the potential for sustainable local enterprise development for Palestinians. Historically 
enslaved and recently displaced, the Darfuri blacksmiths began to organize and operate as a collective 
with the assistance of an NGO partner. Supported by a network of entrepreneurs, partners, and 
access to used steel as a form of finance, the collective are now are a key supplier of innovative 
agricultural implements throughout Darfur and neighbouring states and have begun to break through 
extreme economic, social and political barriers (Abdelnour & Badri, forthcoming).
Within the occupied Palestinian territories, a number of promising activities with strong potential 
to support the development of community-based enterprises and an inclusive social economy are 
currently underway. In Gaza, Hamas has begun to support the building of mud brick homes as a means 
for Gazans to initiate reconstruction, due to the prolonged blocking of reconstruction materials by 
Israel and its allies. Community permaculture projects, such Bustan Qaraaqa in Beit Sahour and 
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the Marda Permaculture Centre in Nablus were launched as innovative models for the sustainable 
cultivation of diverse local produce. These centres had created demonstration farms and seed banks. 
They supported the training of impoverished farmers especially in villages facing immediate land 
confiscation, promoting sustainable livelihoods to Palestinians and Bedouin communities in off-the-
grid and infrastructure-deprived areas. Importantly, they sought to recreate historically-familiar ways 
of life as socioeconomic resistance to the occupation.5 Operating under constant threat and attack by 
Israeli occupation forces, such projects face numerous challenges and will require external political 
and financial support during incubation. Lessons from other regions show that success can be gained 
by fostering market spaces linked with diverse farming communities, and supporting the long-term 
engagement by key NGO catalysts and community-based partners. Partners must act to create safe 
spaces of operation, and facilitate continued innovation, expansion, diversity and strengthening of 
enterprise networks. 
The SLENs model is currently being used to explore the potential role of enterprise in development 
through community-based health interventions for Palestinian refugees in occupied Palestine and 
Lebanon (Hussein, forthcoming). Potential interventions include rooftop agriculture, small-scale health 
franchises, and certified mid-wives. In Lebanon, impoverished farmers have successfully begun to 
promote economic resistance through local organic agriculture networks. Using mobile agriculture 
clinics, social justice and environmental activists are developing organic agriculture systems among 
Lebanon’s rural poor, including war-affected communities in the South (Nabhan, 2008). These locally-
rooted and certified organic agriculture associations cultivate agricultural products which support 
Lebanon’s cultural and natural crop biodiversity. The result is economic resilience supported by 
local Earth Markets and other “slow food” initiatives rooted in the principles of sustainable cultural 
and agricultural development.6  The development of strong local markets will complement efforts of 
existing agricultural cooperatives and fair trade initiatives seeking to created international market 
access and awareness, such as the Palestinian olive oil initiative Zaytoun.
Conclusions and recommendations
For Palestinians, an inclusive enterprise development approach should explore effective de-linking 
from Israeli-imposed constraints, a superficial and stagnant peace process, economic normalization, 
and existing aid-distorting mechanisms. A SLENs approach has the potential to engage diverse 
partners and community stakeholders – including government actors and community leaders – in an 
inclusive development dialogue. It can strengthen community capacities for self-determination within 
a framework of economic and social development. 
Palestinian community leaders and policy makers should consider establishing SLEN committees 
to engage local entrepreneurs and other stakeholders in their respective communities. Locale-
specific business models can be developed with local actors through strategic facilitation, drawing 
on experiences from other parts of the world. Such committees should consider immediate priorities 
to address food security, clean water and sanitation, construction, health, and energy. For example, 
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appropriate technology and related skills development might explore simple construction techniques 
using locally-sourced materials such as mud and stone, and small-scale, off-grid energy and water 
purification systems to minimize vulnerability, maximize self-sufficiency, and support local small-scale 
industry in manufacturing, agriculture, and other sectors.
Samer Abdelnour is completing a PhD in Management in the field of enterprise and development in postwar and 
conflict contexts. His doctoral research explores interactions among NGOs during humanitarian response, and 
the role of community-based and collective enterprise in postwar peace-building and development. He currently 
manages applied research projects across Sudan (Darfur, Southern Sudan, Blue Nile) and supports similar work 
among Palestinian refugees (Lebanon, occupied Palestine).
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Endnotes
1.  http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Paris_Protocol.asp
2. By the end of 2008, 80 percent of Gazans were dependent on food aid. The World Bank estimated that the 
contraction of the private sector in Gaza would be extremely difficult to reverse because 96 percent of its 
industrial operations had been suspended.
3. Wataniya, a mobile phone company, received misdirected aid allegedly due to connections with Palestinian 
Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, members of his family, inner circle, and foreign investors.
4. Other contexts include technical, vocational and enterprise training and rehabilitation in post-war Southern 
Sudan (Atari, Abdelnour, McKague & Wager, 2010); and enterprise capacity for the development and reintegration 
of internally displaced persons in Darfur and Southern Sudan (Abdelnour, Badri, El Jack, Wheeler, McGrath 
& Branzei, 2008). The United Nations Development Programme’s Growing Inclusive Markets initiative, now in 
its second phase, adopts a similar local enterprise framework to explore successful cases of enterprise and 
development in building community-inclusive markets in poverty contexts (UNDP, 2008). 
5. http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10575.shtml
6. The “slow food movement” is a rapidly expanding international movement which seeks to preserve and promote 
local: food systems, seed varieties, culinary traditions, traditional foods and preparation techniques, small-scale 
processing, food education, family farms, and ethical local marketplaces.  
http://www.slowfood.com/
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